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The standard view of income redistribution is that it comes
at a cost income is lost because the policies required to redistribute
it misallocate resources. In a famous passage from his book, Equality
and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff, Arthur Okun compared the loss
to a leak in a bucket. Under any tax and transfer program,
the money must be carried from the rich to the poor in a
leaky bucket. Some of it will simply disappear in transit, so
the poor will not receive all the money that is taken from the
rich. (Okun, 1975, p. 91)
One argument for redistribution based purely on efficiency
has been made for the case when risk markets are incomplete and
individuals are risk averse. Tax-transfer policies have the potential
to provide a partial substitute for risk markets that are missing
because of problems of information or because not all the parties
that would benefit from a risk-sharing contract are alive at the same
time.1
Our concern in this paper is with an entirely different
efficiency-based argument for redistribution. The motivation of the
tax—transfer policies considered in this paper is not to smooth utility
across states of nature, but to reduce agency costs. We reach two
central conclusions. First, Pareto improvements can be achieved
from simple, redistributive tax-transfer policies in spite of the
distortion in labor supply that they create, and in spite of our
assumption of risk neutrality. Second, simple tax-transfer policies
are in some circumstances more effective than directinterventions
1See, for example, Eaton and Rosen (1980), Varian (1980),
Gordon and Varian (1988), and Hoff (1991).through corrective taxes and subsidies.
Simple intuition supports these results. The use of collateral
often efficiently resolves moral hazard and adverse selection
problems. 'In fact, if individuals are risk neutral, a sufficiently high
amount of wealth or collateral will always resolve a problem of moral
hazard, since it makes it possible to structure transactions so that the
party taking the "hidden action" bears fully the consequences of his
action; the link between performance and rewards can be made
perfect. In this paper, the tax-transfer scheme creates a bootstrap
form of collateral. It does so by transforming future labor earnings
subject to idiosyncratic risk into a risk-free form of income--and
hence an ideal source of collateral.2
There is another way to explain the intuition behind our
results. When there is private information in an economy, some
mutually beneficial exchanges between transactors are not
compatible with the incentives of the participants; an incentive
constraint binds.A general property of incentive constraints is that
they shift with even marginal redistributions of income, as illustrated
in Hoff (1994). In the present paper, the tax-financed redistribution
relaxes incentive constraints, and the resulting expansion in
individuals' opportunities more than offsets the loss from the
distortionary tax finance.
We demonstrate these points in a model of investment in
higher education that is of some independent interest. The model
addresses concerns raised by Arthur Okun. He speculated that one
2A critical factor in both thispaper and the literature cited in
footnote I is the incompleteness of markets. In this paper, there is
an incomplete set of markets in state-contingent labor; see section 8.
2of the most serious economic inefficiencies in the U.S. was under-
investment in the human capital of the children of poor families
(Okun, especially pp. 80-8 1). It remains truein the U.S. today that
parental income is an important determinant in children's
educational attainment.3 Card (1993a, l993b) finds that the
marginal return to schooling among the population ofless-educated
individuals is higher than the return to the educated population.
This evidence supports the càntention that many children withhigh
academic ability stop their schooling too soon, perhaps due to an
inability to afford higher education. At the same time, thereis other
evidence of over—investment in the aggregate in college education,
at least if we abstract from the non-ecoftomic endsof education.
There are far more college graduates than traditionally college—level
jobs. In each year between 1980 and 1990, the percentageof college
graduates who were in jobs that did not require a degree orwho
were unemployed stood at roughly onein five (Hecker, 1992, table
I). The model provides a framework withinwhich one can interpret
both under-investment by the poor and over-investmentin the
3Okun (p. 81) cites a study indicating that among male high
school graduates with equal academic ability, the proportiongoing
to college averages 25 percent lower in thebottom socioeconomic
quarter of the population than in the top quarter;the corresponding
figure for female high school graduates is 35 percent.Data from the
National Opinion Research Center (1986) show asimilar gap:
Among high school seniors of equalacademic ability, the proportion
going to college in 1982 was 32 percent lowerfor the bottom third
of families, ranked by annual family income, thanfor the top third.
Taubman (1989) cites elasticity estimates of educationalattainment
with respect to parental income ranging from 3 to80 percent.
McPherson and Schapiro (1991) find that collegeenrollment of
children from low-income families is particularlysensitive to the net
cost of college tuition.
3aggregate. The model is closely related to the two-stateinvestment
model used by de Meza and Webb (1987) and Bernanke and Gertler
(1990).
Individuals in the model make choices over labor supply and
occupation.Some occupations require higher education.
Competitive equilibrium results in an efficient allocation of time
between labor and leisure conditional on occupational choice, but an
inefficient sorting of individUals across occupations. Inefficiencies
arise because low-wealth individuals require outside finance to
obtain higher education, and individuals have private information
about their ability to repay the debt. Some of those who borrow to
finance higher education will rationally undertake investments with
negative expected present value because part of the cost of failure is
shifted, through default, to others. This is the problem of over—
investment. This may lead to the problem of under-investment,
however so many bad risks may enter the market that they raise
interest rates for educational loans to prohibitive levels. The result
may be that higher education is beyond the reach of low-wealth
individuals, not because poorer persons are on average less able, but
because bad risks drive out good.
Within the model, we show that there exist simple tax-
transfer policies that yield a Pareto improvement. We suppose that
government can tax future labor income, which is subject to
idiosyncratic risk, and give each individual the expected value of his
tax payment. The tax reduces the labor supply of all individuals.
But the transfers reduce agency costs in the credit market (even
though everyone is risk neutral). The net effect is to increase the
4expected income and utility of every individual.4 In simulations,
we illustrate the Pareto—efficient tax rates and show that the welfare
gain from the tax—transfer scheme is Quantitatively significant. In
other simulations, we explore the tax rates that would maximize
aggregate real income under a redistribution scheme where transfers
are given only to low-wealth individuals. In these simulations, the
income gains to the poor exceed the loss in income of the rich.
Thus, the redistributional buckets of Okun's image need not
be leaky ones. .We do not eliminate the adverse impact of taxation
on hours worked, but we show that the beneficial net impact on
investment in human capital may be more important than the impact
on labor hours.In contrast, the traditional literature on
redistributive taxation, because itabstracts from market
imperfections, finds that a labor tax-transfer policy always reduces
aggregate real incomes (see, for example, Browning and Johnson,
1984).
We start in section 2 by describing the basic model. Sections
3 through 5 present the information structure in which over-
investment in education occurs, and describe our main results on
Pareto-improving and income-increasing redistributions. Up to this
point information is exogenous; in section 6 we assume that an
individual has to exert effort to obtain information about his ability,
and we analyze the problem of under—investment in education by
low-wealth groups. Section 7 compares the effectiveness of targeted
taxes, subsidies, loan guarantees, and transfers.Section 8 discusses
the robustness of our results, and some concluding remarks on
4The expected utility is computed as of the date of the enactment
of the policy, a point that we make precise below.
5education policy follow.
2. Basic Model
There are two endowment goods, labor and a nonconsumable
input good. The nonconsumable input good can be invested in
higher education, which has a risky return, or in an asset that yields
a riskless gross return r. Any amount of the input good can be
invested in the safe asset, but a higher education program is
indivisible: it requires one uffit of the input good. The payoff if the
individual successfully completes a program of higher education is
an increase in his labor productivity from w to aw (a >1).The
probabiliiy of successfully completing the program of higher
education is given by p for each individual.
A natural way to interpret the model is that an individual's
labor productivity is w in a low-skill occupation, while it is aw in a
high-skill occupation. Successful completion of a program of higher
education is a prerequisite to entry into a high-skill occupation. In
this model a and w are exogenous; we focus on the choice of labor
supply and occupation given a and w.
The expected utility of an individual is defined as
(I) U=E(y)-v(2)
where E(y) is expected income; v(2) is the disutility of labor, with
v'> 0 and v'> 0.Abstracting from the fixed cost of education, the
maximized surplus of an individual in the skilled occupation is
(2) R Max (aw2 -v(2)).
("R" is for the return to the risky investment in higher education.)
In the unskilled occupation, the maximized surplus is
6(3) S Max (wRs— v(2s)}.
("S"is for the safe return to labor.) Hence R> S. Conditional on p,
the expected social return to higher education is
(4) a(p)Ep[R-S]-r,
since p[R-S] is the expected increment to real income, and r is the
opportunity cost (one unit of the endowment good times the gross
interest factor r).
We assume that per capita wealth exceeds one, so that it is
feasible for every individual in the economy to undertake higher
education. Whether or not it is efficient to do so depends on the
individual's probability, p, of successfully completing a program of
higher education. We will assume, by choice of parameters, thatit
is efficient for some, but not all, individuals to undertake higher
education.
To find the first-best allocation of individuals to higher
education programs, a social planner would solve the following
problem: Choose a cut-off value of p, denoted p0, suchthat if, and
only if, an individual's success probability is at least p0,the social
return to education is positive. For p above p0, theindividual
undertakes higher education. For p below p0, the individual does





which .can be rewritten as aL(pQ) =0.The social planner expects
zero social returns, on the marginal student in a programof higher
education. Since the marginal student has the lowest success
7probability of all students, expected social returns for all
inframarginal students are positive.
3. Competitive Equilibrium with Private Information
This section derives an incentive constraint that leads to
inefficient occupational choice in the competitive equilibrium with
private information. We assume that lenders know onlythe
probability distribution of abilities, but do not know which
probability is applicable to a particular borrower. Until section 6,
we will also assume that
(4.1) An individual learns his probability of success costlessly before
he undertakes higher education.
As before, we parameterize occupational choice as the choice of a
cut-off value p, such that only if an individual has a success
probability at least equal to his choice of p does he undertake the
program of higher education. But now p is chosen byeach
individual, not by a social planner.
There is a perfectly competitive labor market and financial
market. An individual whose endowment of the input good, W, is
less than 1 will have to borrow in the financial market to undertake
a program of higher education. If he succeeds in the program, he
repays the loan, but if he fails at higher education, hedefaults.5
Because of the possibility of default, the lender's break—even interest
factor, i, exceeds the opportunity cost of funds, r. One consequence
of this and the assumption that endowments are observable is that an
individual who undertakes higher education will always put up as
5This assumption is stronger than needed to obtain our qualitative
results; we require only that an individual who fails in a higher
education program has a probability of defaulting on his loan.
8much finance himself as he can.6 An individual for whom W 1
does not borrow and solves the same problem as the social planner in
making his occupational choice; thus, he invests in higher education
if he learns that his success probability is at least p0. An individual
for whom W c1will choose a value of p that maximizes his
expected utility, taking into account the possibilityof default. He
will therefore choose to undertake higher education for all p for
which his expected income if he undertakes education is greater than
or equal to his expected income if he does not:
(6) p(R -i[1-W])+[1-p]SS +rW.




i.e., that the interest rate is not so high that theindividual does not
gain from succeeding in the higher education program.At a
sufficiently low value of W, (8) may not be satisfied, andin that case
the outcome is zero investment in higher education regardlessof p.
We will discuss the case of zero-investment in a slightlyricher model
presented in section 6. Until then, we will assumethat (8) is
satisfied. (7) then says that the individual equates the expectedgain
from undertaking higher education at hisreservation success
¼proofof this is in de Men and Webb (1987, p. 289), whoalso
show that the standard debt contract dominates an equitycontract.
A standard debt contract will be the optimal contractunder a slight
extension of the model where some individuals have a"distaste" for
higher education and so will not pursue it regardlessof their ability,
and this taste parameter is private information. The prooffollows
the lines of Bernanke and Gertler (1990, Appendix).
9probability with his opportunity cost of undertaking higher
education.
Lenders lend based on an estimated probability
E(p p ￿ p) that they will be repaid. Because of maximum equity
participation, p* can be inferred from the loan amount, 1 -W.
Perfect competition and the pooling of risk drive expected profits of
lenders down to zero. To break even, a lender will require a gross
finance charge per dollar leni of
=____
Eachperson's p is a random variable drawn from a distribution
function H (and density function h), so that
(10) =fph)dp.
The interest rate reflects the average risk of individuals who are
observationally equivalent to the lender: the good risks cross-
subsidize the bad risks.7 As a consequence, an individual's private
expected return to higher education, p{R -S-i[1-W]}-rW,is more
than (equal to, less than) the social expected return, á(p), as his
success probability p is less than (equal to, more than) the average of
his wealth class, p(p*)
Substituting (9) into (7) yields the reduced form incentive-
compatibility constraint governing p*:
7Since p is a function of wealth (as we shortly show), interest
rates charged by lenders will depend on wealth and the cross-
subsidization will occur only withineachwealth class.
10(11) p'[R-S] =JW+[1-W]Pt
p(p')
Since p*/p(p*) <Iand W <Ifor any borrower, the term in braces
is also strictly less than one, which implies that p*[R -5]c r, so
(12) 6.(p*) <0.
The marginal borrower, who is just indifferent between undertaking
and not undertaking higher education, makes a negative present
value social investment. The reason is that individuals do not take
account of the social cost borne by others when theydefault. They
undervalue the true total costs and undertake education whenit is
inefficient to do so. Differentiating (11) yields dp/dW >0.As
simple intuition would suggest, the moral hazard problemis greater,
the more of the individual's costs are borrowedfunds.8
For any given wealth class that chooses V <pIP0, the agency
costs incurred in the competitive equilibriumallocation are
equivalent to throwing away, on a per capita basis, resourceswith a
value of
8With different assumptions about information and the choice set
of borrowers, the marginal borrower (or marginal project)could be
the lowestrisk,not the highestrisk,and therefore the most, not the
least, profitable to the lender.In this case the problem of
asymmetric information would normally lead tounder-investment,
not over—investment, in the competitive equilibrium, asde Meza and
Webb (1987, Proposition 5)showed.Our central result in section 4
that there is scope for Pareto-improvingredistributions. holds, in
general, in both cases. Our result turns on thefact that the transfer
serves as a form of collateral, and anincrease in collateral increases
market efficiency. The latter result holds in awide variety of
models; see Chan and Thakor (1987) andBester (1987).For
limitations on that result that may arise when the borrower'swealth
is not observable to the lender, see Stiglitz andWeiss (1981, Section
III).(13) L =- fA(p)h(p)dp.
p.
Wederive in Appendix A the relation between changes in L with






(14) means that an intervention that increased the individual's choice
of pt would, through its effect on the equilibrium interest rate,
increase expected utility by exactly the marginal reduction in the
loss, L.
4. Pareto-Improving Redistributions
This section will show that a labor tax whose revenues are
returned in lump sum fashion can yield a Pareto improvement. We
could think of the tax as financing lump-sum grants, G, of the
consumption good at the end of the period or, alternatively, lump-
sum transfers, G/r, of the endowment good at the beginning of the
period.9 All individuals with the same wealth face the same tax rate
91n the first case, the government would announce that it would
make transfers at the end of the period. These transfers, being
riskless and collateralizable, would enable individuals to issue bonds
at the riskless rate r. In low—income countries, it is not uncommon
for government transfer payments to be pledged as collateral for
debts; see, e.g., Platteau et al. (1980, p. 1767) and Sanderatne (1986,
p. 349).
In the second case, the government would use the receipts
from a bond sale to financeS grants of the endowment good at the
12t and receive the same transfer G. The tax-transfer program is ex-
post redistributional because although everyone with equal wealth
receives the same transfer payment, those who have succeeded in
higher education enter the high—wage occupation and, given their
higher labor income, pay more in taxes.




Recalling that in the Nash equilibrium, an individual
finances his own education to the extent feasible, he now maximizes




— — w — .211, + [1—p]S St +rW+0,
which defines p by the relation
(16) .f_st-i[i _w_.2jJ
= rW+G.
The individual equates the increase in his expected income if he
undertakes higher education at his reservation probability of success,
p, to his opportunity cost of higher education, rW + 0. Since G/r
enters into (16) exactly as W does, we have
beginning of the period. At the end of the period, the government
would pay off the bonds by taxing labor.
13(17) 4o)aw°
We call this effect the collateral effect. The transfer, G, allows the
individual to put more of his own wealth at risk when he undertakes
higher education. With greater equity in himself, the individual is
more selective in his choice of whether or not to proceed with higher
education; and this raises pt
The labor tax also affects p by affecting the payoffs to
work, R and S. Differentiating (16) with respect to I yields what
could be called the relative price effect of the tax policy:
-p[aw-wç] I
(18) at G P1 -- i[i-w-_]
with strict inequality for p >0.Thus, the tax tends to reduce the
incentive to gamble on higher education, which raises PS.
Fig. IA illustrates the ability of the tax-transfer scheme to
mitigate the incentive problem in the capital market. In the
simulation, we assume that v(2) =2, correspondingto a constant
(compensated and uncompensated) labor supply elasticity of 0.5.
The wage rate w in the unskilledoccupation is 3 and in the skilled
occupation is 6. The gross riskless interest rate r over the period the
educational loan is outstanding is 1.5. Success probabilities p for
each individual are distributed according to the bell-shaped density
function h(p) =6[p-p2].
The shaded areas in the figure illustrate the deviation of p
from p0, for wealth endowments in the interval [0,1). The sum of
14these two areas represents the distortion in p from first—best under
competitive equilibrium, and the hatched area represents that part of
the distortion that is avoided under the Pareto optimal tax-transfer
policy. For example, for a person with no endowment wealth, the
competitive equilibrium yields p =0.0,and the Pareto optimal tax-
transfer policy raises V to .38. This is close to the first—best
threshold, p0 =.41,which is independent of endowment wealth.
Of course, the tax—transfer policy has to be judged by its
effect on welfare.The effect of the tax-transfer policy on
individual expected utility is the sum of three terms: the direct
effect of the tax on income, the direct effect of the transfer on
income, and the indirect effect of the tax-transfer policyvia its
influence on the equilibrium interest rate.10 We have
(19)du =-Ndt+dG+aALPa+
aid'aWr at
-Ndt +dG- ___a+ ._atI(from (14)), dWr at
where N denotes an individual's expected pretax labor earnings,
(20) N E + [1-H][cd
—
Thetax-transfer policy will be Pareto-improving if expected
10We apply the envelope theorem to the variables .e and 2, but
not to p. The individual is not optimizing with respect to psince
he treats i as parametric; thus the term aU/Op5 hfbd=0,whereas
the total derivative, dU/dp, is positive (recalling (14)).The term
t(p) is defined as pt[R-S1]-r by analogy to (4).This term is not
the expected social return to higher education, conditional onPS,
since it isnet of tax collections. Instead, it is the combinedafter-tax
expected return to the lender and marginal borrower.
15utility increases when the net government costof the policy is zero.
The government budget associated with each personis, in
expectation, B =tN-G.Diversification across taxpayers ensures
that a transfer that is feasible in expected termswill also be feasible





or that any incremental changes in revenuesand transfers add up to
0. The difference, Ndt —dG,is the revenue effect of the policy at
the initial tax base, while the terms inside the braces arethe changes
in the initial tax base resulting from changes in thetax—transfer
policy.
These taxes and transfers show up in the model by changing
the individual's endowments and his choices over labor hoursand
occupation. To check whether the tax-transfer policyis Pareto-
improving, we substitute the balanced budget condition (21)into the




+ + a1)_ +
ap'aWr at
The tax—transfer policy raises the preferred cut—off point for
investment in human capital, p, which reduces negative present
value investments and so reduces the competitive interest rate
charged. These effects are captured by the first of the two termsin
16(22). As p rises, agency costs, given by (13), fall. The reduction
will be larger (a) the greater the density of persons who would
withdraw from the market if their collateral were increased, as
measured by h*, (b) the more negative the expected after-tax return
to the marginal investor and his lender, t(p*), (c) the greater the
increase in p through the collateral effect, Op*/8(G/r) =ap*/OW,
and (d) the greater the increase in p through the relative price
effect, 8p/Ot.
The second term in (22) is the effect of the tax—transfer
policy on the tax base. Starting from a zero tax rate, the government
initially is collecting no money from labor taxes and so the reduction
in labor earnings N does not affect the budget. The second term
vanishes. Hence, >0,which proves dt.-o
Proposition I. There exists a Pareto—improving redistributive policy
consisting of a positive labor tax and a lump-sum grant to each
individual in an amount equal to his expected tax payment.
Fig. lB illustrates the welfare gain at the Pareto optimal tax
rates. For each level of endowment wealth, the Pareto optimal wage
tax rate occurs where the marginal deadweight loss from increasing
the labor tax rate is just offset by the marginal gain from the shift
in the incentive constraint (16). Given the parameter values used for
fig. IA, a tax rate on labor of 11.7 percent is Pareto optimal for
individuals with zero wealth. The optimal tax rate declines
approximately linearly as wealth increases from 0 to 1.(It is
indicated for selected wealth values in fig. lB.) For those with
wealth of at least one unit, the incentive constraint (16) does not
bind and the optimal tax rate is, of course, zerO.
The figure expresses the Pareto improvement from the
17optimal labor tax rate as a percentage of thedifference between
expected utility obtained under a first-bestallocation and the
competitive equilibrium. The tax-transfer policy recaptures more
than 70 percent of the agency costs for all groups withwealth
between zero and 0.99 units.11
5. Redistributions to Maximize Aggregate Income
The previous section considered Pareto optimal tax—transfer
schemes. Income redistribution was cxpost, contingenton the
resolution of uncertainty; each person expected to make tax
payments precisely equal to the lump-sum transferhe received. This
section considers instead a tax-transfer policy where transfers are
paid only to the lowest wealth group. Tax rates are chosen to
maximize the sum over all persons of expected real income, E(y) —
v(2).Parameter values for these simulations are the same as in the
earlier simulation, but we now additionally need to specify a
distribution of wealth. For simplicity, we assume there are only two
wealth levels: zero wealth and two units of wealth.
11As noted above, the figure is based on an assumed compensated
labor supply elasticity of 0.5.Thisexceeds most estimates of the
compensated elasticity for primary workers, although it may
understate the elasticity for secondary workers (see, e.g., Hausman,
1985). Sensitivity analysis was conducted with respect to the labor
supply elasticity.Increases in the compensated labor supply
elasticity increase the standard deadweight loss from taxation, but in
this model they affect other parameters, such as p and p0, which
can also affect the welfare gains from the tax—transfer policy. We
find significant efficiency gains from the tax-transfer policy at very
low compensated labor supply elasticities (recovering as much as 99.8
percent of the loss in utility created by agency costs at a
compensated elasticity of 0.01) and decreasing efficiency gains for
a wide range of higher elasticities (e.g., ranging from 81 percent to
50 percent over the elasticity range of 0.75 to 1.5, given zero wealth).
18The experiment that we consider is differential proportional
wage taxes on the zero-wealth and high-wealth individuals, with
transfer payments made in lump sum fashion to those with no
wealth. Recall that a wage tax has a relative price effect for all
individuals, in addition to the traditional labor-leisure distortion.
The relative price effect is strictly welfare—increasing for the low-
wealth group, but it creates an additional distortion for the high-
wealth group affecting occupational choice. As a result, the optimal
labor tax rate on the low-wealth individuals will exceed that on
high-wealth individuals.
Fig. 2A shows the real income-maximizing tax rate schedule
for a range of populations at the two wealth levels. The horizontal
axis measures the ratio of those with wealth of two units relative to
those without wealth. If no high-wealth workers exist, the socially
optimal tax rate is 11.7 percent, identical to the simulation examined
in the last section. As the proportion of high-wealth workers
increases, the taxes they pay make it desirable to reduce the tax rate
on those without wealth. While tax rates fall, the sizeof the transfer
payment increases. Because the larger grant to thosewithout wealth
induces them to choose a reservation success probability closer to the
social optimum, and because the lower tax rates (but broader
coverage) reduce the excess burden in the labor market, the ex ante
redistributive tax-transfer policy can bring aggregate real income
close to that of the first—best allocation.
Fig. 2B shows the gain that is achievable. The measureof the
gain is the analog, in terms of aggregate real incomes,of that used
in fig. lB for individual real income. If there are as many as10
individuals with wealth of two units for every individual with zero
19wealth, 95 percent of the loss in aggregate real incomecreated by the
incentive constraint can be recaptured, an increase relative to the 89
percent recaptured in the Pareto optimaltax—transfer policy.
6. A More General Model
The model of the preceding section showed how a tax-
transfer scheme could be used to solve a problem of over-investment
in higher education. But the more difficult and important problem
of public policy is generally argued to be under-investmentin higher
education by the poor.The model above generated under-
investment if (8) was violated. Under-investment is even more
likely if we replace assumption (A.l) above by the morerealistic
assumption that knowledge of one's ability comes at a cost.For the
remainder of this paper, we replace (A.l) by (A.2):
(A.2) An individual learns his probability of success in higher
education by exerting effort at utility cost e. Without exerting
such effort, he can never succeed at higher education.
It is natural to interpret the cost e as the effort cost of applying
oneself in publicly provided primary and secondary school.
We assume that it is efficient for everyone to prepare for
higher education so as to learn his ability to enter the high-wage
occupation. Formally,
(23) [1 -H*0]ts(p(p*o))>e.
This says that the expected return to preparation evaluated at V0
exceeds the sunk cost e. But (23) does not ensure that everyone
prepares for higher education in a competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 2. For W c I, each individual's private expected net return




dW [_h.a@) + dp'JdW
(by using (4))
= [1-Hii[1W]24(by using (10) and (2-A) in the Appendix)
which hasthesame sign as dp*/dW and hence is strictly positive.
See fig. 3.U
Proposition 2 immediately implies'3
Proposition 3. If e is sufficiently high, there will exist a nonnegative
level of wealth, E. such that individuals with endowments below jfdo
not prepare for higher education.





Given the incentive constraints (11) and (24), everywealth class is
in one of three cells illustrated in fig. 4. The fourthcell is empty,
recalling (23).
7. The Scope for Price Policy
In economies with imperfect information, theregenerally
exist corrective taxes (Pigouvian taxes or subsidies)that yield Pareto
improvements (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986).This section will show
that the scope for corrective taxes is limited inthis model. Under
12We use the fact that dp/dp* =h*[p-
intuitionbehind propositions 2 and 3 is the same asthat
behind Bernanke and Gertler's (1990) proposition3.
21some circumstances, credit taxeswill not be effective at all; and
under all circumstances, lump sum transferswill dominate credit
subsidies.
In this model, corrective taxes operate throughtheir effects
on two incentive constraints, (24)and (11), interpretable as
governing the decisions to invest effortin primary and secondary
school, and to invest physical wealth in highereducation. The first
constraint is not binding on a borrower with sufficientlyhigh
wealth, i.e., for whom W >3 thesecond constraint is always
binding for a borrower. Barring one specialcondition, set out in
proposition 4, a credit tax or subsidy has oppositeeffects on the two
constraints: a price policy that loosens one constraint tightensthe
other.
First consider a tax on credit. An individual's choiceof p
is increasing in i; hence, a high enough tax on credit could always
induce the efficient choice, p0,14 provided that theincentive
constraint in (24) does not bind. Under one condition,stated as
proposition 4 below, we obtain the novel result that a tax oncredit
can actually raise the borrower's expected after—tax privatereturn to
higher education.15 It thereby simultaneously relaxesconstraints
(11) and (24). To see how this can occur, notice that acredit tax, by
increasing an individual's preferred choice of p, increasesthe
14This result is verified by differentiating the expression defining
p* in (7) to obtain dp*/di =p*[l_W]/(R_S_i[1_W])>0.
15But a higher interest rate is not sustainable as a Nash
equilibrium (by means other than government intervention) because
every lender would have an incentive to shavehis interest rate and
thereby increase his market share and his profits.
22expected probability of success andreduces the equilibrium interest
rate. The condition under whichthese two effects more than offset
the tax payment is that fic 0in (25) below. This condition is more
likely to hold if, for a given wealth group,the negative return on
marginal investors in human capitalis large relative to the average
return for that group (_A(p*)/a1(p)is large). It is also more likely if
din p/dlnp* is large; that is, a small percentagechange in p induces
a large percentage changein the average quality of the applicant
pool.
Proposition 4.A tax on credit atrateTincreases(decreases) the
expectedafter-tax private return to preparation forhigher education.
[1_H i(MP) -PTE1W1}. iffiisnegative (positive). where
(25) P + •(pt)
dp
Proof. See Appendix B.
In the anormal case of fi> 0,the credit tax decreases
expected after—tax returns to preparationfor higher education. As
the credit tax is raised, it eventually depressesafter—tax returns by
enough to curtail any human capitalformation by those with
endowment wealth below one. Thus wehave
Proposition 5. If fi>0,a tax on credit increasesthe range of wealth
levels over which zero investment ineducation occurs.
Proof. Let #(W,T) [l_H*1((p)_PT[1_W1).After the imposition
of a credit tax,is implicitly defined by QLT) =e.Since
8/8W> 0 from proposition 2 and a#/8T<0from proposition 4 for
fl>0,applying the implicit function theoremyields d3JdT> 0, as
was to be shown.M
23In summary, there exists a credit tax that yields a first—best
efficient outcome if either (24) does not bind or ficO. Butin the
normal case where fi>0,the tax on credit tightens (24); in terms of
fig. 4, a credit tax can push a wealth class from cell 1into cell 2.
With respect to individuals in cell 2, the objective of price
intervention is to solve a problem of under-investment, not over-
investment. The only price policy that can do this (given fl>0)is
one that subsidizes the cost of education.
Because there is no credit rationing in this model, credit
subsidies, direct loans, and loan guarantees have identical effects.
For concreteness the next two propositions consider a credit subsidy
to lenders at rate a, where 0 ￿ a r. With the subsidy in place, the
zero-profit condition for lenders is no longer given by (9) but by
r -a=
Proposition6. if fi>0,a creditsubsidyreduces the range of wealth
levels overwhichzero investment ineducationoccurs.
Proof The credit subsidy at rate a is equivalent to a negative tax on
credit at rate T =- a,';.It follows from proposition 5 that
d/da .c 0. Since this derivative is bounded away from zero for W
below I, there exists a subsidy rate a* that induces preparation for
higher education, for any given endowment W.R
The remainder of this section shows that government would
not wish to use a credit subsidy or loan guarantee; a lump-sum
transfer would be more effective. This is established by showing
16Suppose that a loan guarantee ensured the lender of receiving
an amountper dollar lent in the event of default. With the
guaantee Jn place, the zero—profit condition for lendersis
r =pi+[I-p],so that the guarantee has the san effect in the
competitive equilibrium as a subsidy where a =[l—p]'y.
24that an increase in the subsidy rate a, financed by a reduction in a
lump-sum grant 0, could never increase an individual's expected
utility, and wouldgenerally lower it.
Consider a government budget constraint in terms of per
capita expenditures for a target low-wealth group, B =
[l_H*][l_W_G/r]o÷0, where B denotes revenues financed by taxes
imposed on a high-wealth group,'7 and the right-hand side terms
denote, respectively, expected outlays through the credit subsidy
program and outlays through the grant.All amounts are in units of
the end-of-period consumption good.
The individual chooses either to prepare for higher
education, obtaining expected utility denoted u" (for prepare), or
not to prepare for higher education, obtaining expected utility
denoted UN' (for not prepare), where




His willingness to give up transfers in exchange for an increase in
the subsidy rate is of course zero when UNP ￿ u, and otherwise is
17This assumption simplifies the proof because it makes revenues
independent of the policy mix between subsidies and transfer.But
our result that a lump-sum transfer Pareto dominatesthe credit
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The far right-hand side fraction is what the marginal rateof
substitution (MRS) would be if his choice over p* were independent
of a and G: The numerator is the direct effect on expectedincome
of an increase in a, which depends on the probability thathe
borrows (1Ht) and the amount he borrows (l-W-G/r).The
denominator is the direct effect on expected income of an increase
in G by one unit, which is equal to one less the credit subsidy
foregone as a result of the fall in his loan size by hr units,times the
probability that he borrows (I _H*). This fraction exceeds theactual
MRS, as shown. In the numerator of the MRS, there is anadditional
term, which is the loss in expected utility produced bythe increase
in the equilibrium interest rate as a rises. In the denominator, there
is an additional term, which is the gain produced by a fall in the
equilibrium interest rate as G rises. Recalling (14), the additional
term in the numerator and denominator, respectively, canbe
rewritten as 8L/Oa (a strictly positive term), and OL/3G (a strictly
negative term): credit subsidies increase waste, govern ment transfers
reduce it.
Now consider the tradeoff between a and 0 along the
government's budget constraint. A balanced budget change
increasing a requires no adjustment to 0 whenUM ￿ u, and
otherwise entails
26[1-H']1-W- -01-W-Qlh''







The term shown to the right of the inequality is identical to the last
term of (26); it is what the balanced-budgettradeoff would be if p*
were held fixed. But it is less than the government'sactual tradeoff
because as a rises and G falls, the individual's preferredchoice of p
falls, increasing by h*dp* the probability with respectto that
individual of government outlays of o[l-W-G/r].
Since, for each individual, the MRS is less than or equal to
the tradeoff between a and G along the government's budget
constraint, we have:
Proposition 7. A lump-sum grant dominates acredit subsidy for
every wealth group.
Theproposition illustrates the general principle thatin order
to design effective policies to remedy a market failure,one has to
understand its underlying source. The source of the marketfailure
is that individuals who do not succeed in the highereducation
program default and shift part of the costof education to others. An
equilibrium with zero investment in education by a givenwealth
group occurs if the cost—shifting problemis sufficiently severe that,
27for that wealth group, the expected private return topreparation foi
higher education is negative.Creditsubsidies do not correct the
externality;instead, they mask its effects by loweringthe interest
rate charged to borrowers, and they tightenthe incentive constraint
(11) that is at the heart of the marketfailure. On efficiency grounds
it is therefore better to distribute funds tolow-wealth persons
through grants, which relax the incentiveconstraint, than through a
credit subsidy.
8. Robustness
A principal conclusion of this paperhas been that
redistribution financed with distortionary taxes canincrease
efficiency. It is natural to ask whether thisconclusion can be laid to
the special assumptions of the model. We alreadytouched on the
consequences of some alternatives tothe informational assumptions
used in the model, and argued that the answer tothis question was
"No." In this section we explore the consequences of adding amarket
in forward labor, and allowing for pre-existing labor taxes.
8.1 Forward Labor Markets
Suppose that there was a forward marketin labor. Then one
might expect that an individual who had decided toborrow would
gain from forward labor sales. A competitivemarket would pay him
p/r per dollar of future labor earnings in the high-skilloccupation.
Recall that if the individual fails in the higher education program,
he defaults. Knowing this, and knowing that individualswho choose
not to undertake higher education could never gainfrom forward
labor sales, a buyer on the forward labor market would paynothing
for earnings in the unskilled occupation. Thus, for everydollar an
individual could obtain through forward sales, he would forego r;
28of future expected income. The forwardtransaction would allow
him precisely the same intertemporalreallocations as the credit
market. The opening of forward labor market wouldbe redundant!
More generally, the redundancy result would obtain to the
extent that bankruptcy laws treat in the same waycreditors in the
financial market and owners of contracts in theforward labor
market. Some labor income will normally be protectedfrom the
claims of creditors, whether they be banks, employers, or anyother
claimants.18 The fundamental causes of agency costs in this model
are asymmetric informationcombined with limited liability and
limited capacity to repay debt in the case of failure, notthe absence
of forward labor markets.
This model provides a rationale for the widespread useof one
kind of forward labor market, where an employerfinances the
education of his employee, contingent on the employee's
commitment to remain with the firm for a minimum term.Such tied
labor—credit arrangements occur because the employerhas better
knowledge than a bank would have about the employee'sabilities.
8.2 Pie-existing taxes
Suppose that there were pre-existing taxes.One might think
that our result that a tax—transfer policy increases aggregatereal
incomes would be very much weakened when allowance wasmade
for high, pre-existing labor taxes, since the marginal excessburden
per additional dollar of tax revenuewould in that case be high. This
is a valid criticism of our results on the scope forpareto-improving
18For example, most U.S. states permit a debtor to exempt a
certain amount of personal property, including a portionof wages or
earnings. See Epstein, Nickles, and White (1993,section 8-6).
29taxes (section 4). But it does not applypersuasively to policies that
would increase the tax rate on the primary earnerin a household and
redistribute the revenues as transfers to someother group. A result
due to Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971, pp.158-59) and Atkinson and
Stern (1974) is that, given a pre-existinglabor tax, the marginal cost
of transferring income from an individualthrough an increase in the
labor tax rate depends on his uncompensated,nothis compensated
laborsupply. the marginal cost offunds from.an increase in a
proportional wage tax is one if labor supplyis perfectly inelastic
(and less than one if backwardbending).'9 Much empirical
evidence sUggests that the uncompensated labor supplyelasticity is
close to zero for prime-age male earners [see, e.g.,K.illingsworth
(1983)]. This suggests that pre-existinglabor taxes in themselves do
not rule out the ability to increase aggregatereal incomes through
income transfers from high-wealth to low-wealth groups.
9. Conclusion
Most inalytical work on thetrade-off between efficiency
and equality was implicitly based on the assumptionof perfect
markets. Onèe that assumption is abandoned,the conclusion that
redistributionthrough distortionary taxes reduces aggregateincomes
no longer need hold. We considered anexample where asymmetric
information about individuals' abilities createsinefficiencies in an
assignment problem: some high-ability personshave no access to
higher education and are thus assigned tolow-skill jobs; some low-
ability persons invest in higher education whenthe expected return
19For a recent discussion of this result, see Ballard and Fullerton
(1992). This result is obtained in a model where labor hours,but not
occupation, are endogenous.
30is negative. We showed that redistribution through distortionary
labor taxes, by creating a collateralizable asset, can improve on the
competitive solution to the assignment problem and thereby yield
Pareto improvements and increase aggregate incomes. We focused
on one particular model of the credit market, but the basic principle
applies to many other stories of the credit market and to other
models with moral hazard and adverse selection, where an increase
in an agent's wealth or bond" leads to more efficient allocations.
The result that simple tax—transfer policies can increase
aggregate incomes would be of limited policy relevance if superior
instruments were available to government to reduce agency costs.
For in that case once government had optimally used corrective
policies, then no further gains could be achieved through
redistribution. But we found that where higher education is beyond
the reach of the poor, income transfers are in most circumstances
more effective than targeted credit taxes, subsidies, or loan
guarantees, because the latter do not address the sourceof the market
imperfection. Moreover, as de Meza and Webb and other scholars
have emphasized, using price policy to solve an information problem
is perilous because the information requirements for successful
intervention are extreme.2° In contrast, the ability of an increase
201f the forces governing competitive equilibrium are as
described in the model of section 3 of this paper, then. a tax on
interest income can achieve social efficiency.If the forces
governing competitive equilibrium are those of the modelof Stiglitz
and Weiss, then a subsidyoninterest income can increase social
efficiency because it encourages borrowing by the marginal
individuals (and these are the lowest risk type). If market forces
lead to a separating equilibrium with rationing, then credit subsidies
and direct provision of loans have distinct effects, and thelatter
31in collateralizable wealth to enhance efficiency appears to be fairly
robust.
What does this analysis tell us about real world policy towards
the financing of higher education? U.S. education policyis beset by
many problems, including highdefault rates, a high rate of
unprepared students entering higher education and then dropping
out, and fraudulent training schools that becomemills for obtaining
tuition financed by government-guaranteed loans.21 The modelof
this paper is too simple to provide a firm guide to public policy. But
one might wish to examine the following proposal,which differs
greatly from most current proposals: Every eligiblechild shall
receive a grant, which would be available for school financing when
the child reaches 18 years of age, or for use without restriction at
some later age.22
The analysis of this paper suggests that such a proposal would
bring the private return to investment in human capital closer tothe
social return; it would address the problem of both over- and under-
investment in higher education. Where this proposal differs from
most current educational grant proposals is that the grant can
alternatively be used for non-educational purposes after attainment
of some minimum age. By creating an opportunity cost to the use of
reduces efficiency (Smith and Stutzer, 1989 and Gale, 1990).
21A detailed account of one such school is given in a recent U.S.
legal case, Williams v. National School of Health, Technology, Inc.,
DC EPa, No. 92 2536, 10/22/93.
22We do not discuss here the question of eligibility, but see
Edlin's (1993) proposal for reforming eligibility under the current
U.S. program of college financial aid.
32funds for educational purposes, students would have a strong
incentive to enter a program of higher education, if at all, only after
having prepared for it. Preparation as modelled in this paper should
be interpreted broadly, including, in particular, the acquisition of
information about the quality of any higher education program in
which an individual would consider investing--reducing the
likelihood of fraudulent "education loan mills."
The basic policy question for education finance is quite
simple: if a government department has a mandate to address a
failure in the market for financing higher education, what should it
do? We showed that the classical solution to a market failure
through corrective taxes would, under some circumstances, be
impossible to achieve even if government had perfect information
about the source of the market failure. If government does not have
perfect information, implementing corrective taxes on borrowing
risks lowering welfare. We have argued that a better solution may
exist simply through government grants to the targeted low-wealth
group. Transfers can increase over-all economic efficiencyand the
targeted group's welfare at the same time; under many
circumstances, corrective price policy and loan guarantees cannot.
33Appendix
A.Proof of (14)
The choice of p under individual expected utility









so that the first—order condition is equivalent to
(2-A) hA@) =
[1-H1{R-S-i[1-W]}.4—. dp













=- h'A(,p*) (by using (4) again),
aswasto be shown.
34B. Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is in two parts. Part (i) signsd{[1-H ]a(p)}
dR
and
part (ii) proves that a per unit tax on credit has the same effect on
the expected private return to preparation, [1_H*](p), as a
reduction in R.
(i) Differentiating (7) yields
























[R-S-i[1-W]] +The denominator is positive from (8), so
sign (3w)
=sign +pA(p)
as was to be shown.







Weneed to check if either of these inequalitiesis ruled out by other
conditions onR
in the model. It follows from (7), (8),and the
lender's break-even condition (9) that pt[R-S] -rc 0 and that
B[R-S1 -r>0, so
R.
>' whichis consistent with both sets
of inequalities in (5—A).
(ii)Given (5-A), it remains only toshow that
sign.42= — sign.42,whereT is a positive per unit tax oncredit.
Expected utility after the tax is imposedis
U =Max([1—H'](P[R -[i+T][1-W1}
+ii-is} + H'[S+rWJ) —
p.
sothat the tax affects U in the same way aswould a fall in R in the
amount T[i-W].•
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Figure LB. Pcrccntagc reduction in agency costs with Pareto-optimal wage tax rates.
Ut-tic
This measure isU0—U' where subscripts 0, c, and tindicatethe rwst-t




FigureIA. Real-income maximizing wagetaxrates.









FigureZB. Percentage reduction in agency costs with real-income maximizing
wt-wc
wagetax rates. This measure is W0 —Sc'whereW is aggregate real
income and subscripts 0, c, and t indicate the first-bcst allocation, competitive
equilibrium, and equilibrium under the tax transfer scheme.
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